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NOTES AND COMMENTS

Constitutional Law-Uniform Act to Secure Compulsory Attendance
of Out-of-State Witnesses
In a recent case,1 a judge of the Court of General Sessions of New
York had a certificate filed in a Florida circuit court recommending
that a certain person be taken into custody and delivered to an officer
of the State of New York. This was requested in order to compel his
attendance as a witness before a New York grand jury investigating
a possible conspiracy to steal labor union funds. The certificate was
filed in accordance with a Florida law2 which provided two alternative
methods for compelling a witness within the state to attend a criminal
proceeding in another state. Under this law the witness could be placed
in the custody of officers from another state, or the Florida court
could issue a subpoena ordering him to appear before the out-of-state
proceedings. In the principal case the person sought as a witness was
a resident of Illinois, a state not having such a statute, and was at the
time a visitor in Florida. The Florida court held that the statute was
repugnant to the Federal Constitution and refused to take this person
into custody. On appeal the state supreme court affirmed.
The Florida court based its decision primarily on two grounds. The
first reason advanced was that the statute violated the right of free
ingress and egress among the states. The court affirmed that this was
a privilege of national citizenship and thereby protected under the
privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment against
infringement by state action.8 Secondly, the court stated that article IV,
section 2 of the Constitution guarantees that citizens of each state are
vouchsafed the privileges and immunities appurtenant to citizens of
all other states. It seems the court was inferring that, when a person
has the right to be immune from rendition in the state in which he resides, another state could not deprive him of this immunity even though
he voluntarily left the former state and came within the jurisdiction
of another state. Although the question was not presented by the
facts, the court went on to say that the alternative provision which provided only for a subpoena ordering the witness to appear at the out-ofstate proceeding was also unconstitutional. The court's basis for this
ruling was "that the courts of this state are without power to issue
process effective beyond the borders of this state."4
'Application of the People of the State of. New York, 100 So. 2d 149 (Fla.
1958).
'FA. STAT. ANN. § 942.02 (1941).
'Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 97 (1908). Crandall v. Nevada, 73
U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867).
' Application of the People of the State of New York, 100 So. 2d 149, 155 (Fla.
1958).
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The Florida law in question was modeled after the Uniform Act
which was adopted by the Interstate Crime Commission in 1936.r This
act was designed to prevent state borders from becoming effective barriers for those who would avoid their public duty as material witnesses
simply because of personal inconvenience or a desire to circumvent
the administration of criminal justice.
The origin of this type legislation in the United States may be
traced back as far as 1792. In that year New Hampshire passed an
act 6 under which a person within the state, certified as a material witness in a criminal proceeding, could be summoned to attend trial in any
court of another state. Subsequently, similar laws were enacted by
all the New England states,7 and in 1902 New York passed a comparable statute.8 In general these statutes were of an awkward nature
and applied only to border states. In 1923 the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws took cognizance of the great
need for effective state legislation in this area, and in 1931 the ConferAttendance
ence adopted a draft of "An Act to Secure the Compulsory
9
of Non-Resident Witnesses in Criminal Cases."
The early state statutes and the draft adopted by the Conference on
Uniform State Laws provided for compulsory attendance only when a
10
There was no provision
criminal prosecution was already pending.
for grand jury investigations. Neither was there any provision for the
arrest and delivery of unwilling witnesses to secure their attendance.
Both the foregoing provisions were incorporated into the Uniform Act
passed by the Interstate Crime Commission. 1 Today, the Uniform
Act, which is reciprocal, has been made law in forty-three states. 12 Surprisingly, there have been very few cases dealing with the constitution'UNIFORM ACT TO SECURE THE ATTENDANCE OF WITNESSES FROM WITHIN OR
WITHOUT A STATE IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS (hereinafter called the "Uniform

Act").
'N.H. Laws 1792, at 251-252.
'

Me. Laws 1855, c. 184; Mass. Laws 1873, c. 319; Vt. Acts 1878, No. 43; Conn.

Acts 1903, c. 87; RI. Laws 1907, c. 1462.
' Laws of New York 1902, c. 94. A draft later approved by the National

Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws was basically a restatement
of this New York law.

'NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS AND
PROCEEDINGS, HANDBOOK at 122, 417-23 (1931).
"oNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS AND
PROCEEDINGS, HANDBOOK at 333 (1936).
"INTERSTATE CRIME COMMISsION, HANDBOOK ON INTERSTATE CRIME CONTROL

at 31-33 (1949). 9 U.L.A. at 32-34 (1942). Also, under the earlier draft adopted
by the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, the radius of rendition was limited
to 1,000 miles. The new Uniform Act contains no limitation as to distance. For
a discussion of the mechanics of the Uniform Act as well as the operation of

earlier legislation, see Note, 19 N.C.L. REv. 391 (1941).

"sAll states except Alabama, Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, and Michigan.
GEN. STAT. §§ 8-65 to -70 (1953).

See N.C.
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ality of such legislation. The principal case dramatically brings into
issue the validity of this act, especially with respect to the two added
provisions described above.
In 1904 the first case arose testing the early New York law.' 3 The
court declared it to be a violation of due process and unconstitutional.
However, this decision was admittedly made in haste and without
proper research.' 4 Seven years later, in Massachusetts v. Klaus,'5 the
New York court overruled this earlier holding. The majority of the
court held the statute to be valid and rejected arguments of unconstitutionality based on due process, the privileges and immunities clause,
and the alleged invalid extraterritorial operation of the law. For a
number of years this decision stood unquestioned as the leading case on
the subject.
However, in 1940 an inferior court of Pennsylvania held the new
Uniform Act to be unconstitutional. 16 Three reasons were advanced as
the basis for this decision: (1) that the law abridged the privilege .of
ingress and egress among the.states, (2) that it denied citizens of a
state the privileges and immunities of the state in which they reside, and
(3) that the authority of one state may not be extended beyond its own
borders. This case did not reach a court of last resort.
In re Cooper,'7 in 1941, was the first case testing the Uniform Act
which reached a state supreme court. In this decision the Supreme
Court of New Jersey declared the Uniform Act to be constitutional,
holding that a person certified as a material witness for the defense in a
pending criminal case could be taken into custody and delivered to
officials of another state to assure his attendance. In so holding, the
court rejected objections based on due process. The privileges and immunities clause was not raised as an objection in this case. The New
Jersey court reaffirmed this decision in 1954 and upheld the validity of
the act as applied to witnesses desired by a grand jury.'8
"In re Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 45 Misc. 46, 90 N.Y. Supp. 808 (Sup.

Ct."'1904).
"As the moving party has requested, and the circumstances call for, an
immediate decision of this motion, I have had no time to prepare more than this
brief expression of my impressions." Ibid.
" 145 App. Div. 798, 130 N.Y. Supp. 713 (1st Dep't 1911). Here, in a five to
four decision, the court gave an excellent discussion of all the aspects of this
type 1legislation.
" In re People of New York, 103 LEGAL INTELL. 1055 (Phila. County Ct. of
Quarter Sess. Dec. 6, 1940). This was the first case to pass on the merits of the
Uniform Act. The title of the act had been modified as the result of a New Jersey
decision in 1936. People of New York v. Parker, 16 N.J. Misc. 471, 1 A.2d 54
(Cir.
Ct. 1936).
17 127 N.J.L. 312, 22 A.2d 532 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
8In5 re Saperstein, 30 N.J. Super. 373, 104 A2d 842 (App. Div. 1954). The
court held in this case that the witness, in addition to being compelled to attend,
could be made to produce books and records.
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In the principal case the court appears to emphasize the fact that
the person sought was not charged with a crime and that no criminal
action was then pending. The court also states "that the right of ingress and egress is not absolute, for instance, the Fourteenth Amendment does not limit exercise by the state of the police power to protect
the health, morals and general welfare of the people."' 1 Perhaps the
Florida court would include within this police power the authority to
grant rendition of material witnesses if there is a criminal proceeding
already pending.
The police power of every state unquestionably includes the authority to require persons within the state's borders to testify at grand jury
investigations within that state. This is a fundamental principle of both
English and American common law. 20 When this is done there is a
definite infringement of a person's right of egress from the state. Today,
it is difficult to see the value of a distinction which permits compulsory
attendance before a grand jury in the state in which a person is located
when he is summoned, and which disallows rendition for testimony
before a grand jury in another state. The terms of the Uniform Act
specify that a person shall not be summoned if "undue hardship" would
be involved in the trip. 21 In the realm of the police power, legislative
judgment has been accorded great weight unless it was clearly beyond
the bounds of constitutionality. Should not the legislature be allowed
to exercise this power so as to include the investigation of crime, which
is the necessary forerunner of criminal prosecution?
The traditional interpretation which the courts have made regarding the application of article IV, section 2 of the Constitution has been
that this section prohibits discrimination by a state in favor of its own
citizens and against citizens of other states. 22 Certainly the language
of the Uniform Act applies equally to all those within the state's
borders.2 There is no discrimination. The power of a state over people
within its borders is plenary with respect to the police power. If the
"oApplication of the People of the State of New York, 100 So. 2d 149, 157 (Fla.
1958).
20 Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273 (1919).
21
UNIFORM ACT To SECURE THE ATrENDANCE

AND2 WITHOUT A STATE IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS

OF WITNESSES FROM

§

WITHIN

2.

Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 U.S. 496 (1939). In
this decision it was stated that this clause does not import that a citizen of one
state carries with him into another fundamental privileges and immunities which
come to him necessarily by the mere fact of citizenship in his state, but that in
any state every citizen of any other state is to have the same privileges and immunities which the citizens of that state enjoy. The Court added that the section
prevents a state from discriminating against citizens of other states in favor of its
own.
2 The language of the act specifies only "that a person being within this state
is a material witness.... ." UNIFORM ACT To SECURE THE ATTENDANCE OF WITNESSES FROM WITHIN AND WITHOUT THE STATE IN

CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS

§ 2.
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power exists anywhere to compel witnesses to proceed from one state
to another to testify, it must be in the state in which the witness is
present.
One of the primary objections to the Uniform Act is based on its
so-called extraterritorial effect, i.e., the witness is compelled to appear
before a proceeding outside the territorial jurisdiction of the court
which issues the order. It is submitted that this objection may be
overcome by following the rationale of courts acting in equity when
faced with similar problems.24 Modem cases have established that
in many situations a court of equity may require certain things to be
done beyond the court's territorial jurisdiction.2 5 The problem which
arises when one is required to perform an act in another state is
essentially one of enforcement. The court is not acting entirely extraterritorially, because at the time the witness is subpoenaed he is within
the territorial jurisdiction of the court.
The future validity of the Uniform Act is certainly placed in jeopardy
by the decision in the principal case. Should other states choose to
follow this ruling, it may be almost impossible, as a practical matter,
to obtain the testimony of a witness who lives outside the state or who
has fled to another state to avoid giving testimony. The Federal Fugitive Felon Law, 28 passed in 1934, was intended to provide some relief
in this area in the absence of appropriate state legislation. This law
made it a felony to travel in interstate or foreign commerce in order
to avoid giving testimony in any criminal proceeding. While this law
is certainly beneficial, it fails to provide an adequate solution to the
problem. Obviously it would be completely ineffective as to any
witness who had never entered the state conducting the prosecution or
investigation. Unless the states themselves are allowed to enforce
comprehensive legislation, there appears to be no effective means of
27
securing testimony from unwilling witnesses outside a state.
SHERWOOD H. SMITH, JR.
24

Messner, The Jurisdiction of a Court of Equity Over Persons to Compel

the Doing of Acts Outside the TerritorialLimits of the State, 14 MINN. L. REV.
494 5(1930).
" Ibid. It has been recognized that in certain circumstances a court acting
in equity may (1) restrain proceedings instituted in a foreign tribunal, (2) decree
a conveyance of foreign lands, and (3) restrain or compel the doing of some act
outside the territorial limits of the state.
2618
U.S.C. § 1073 (1952).
"T At the time of this writing, certiorari has been granted by the United States
Supreme Court. Application of the People of the State of New York v. O'Neill,
356 U.S. 972 (1958). Also, motion made by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws for leave to file brief as amicus curiae has been
granted. Application of the People of the State of New York v. O'Neill, 79 S.Ct.

19 (1958).

